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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea for Peer-to-Peer' (P2P) lending spawned from
microcredit principles and has attracted widespread publicity over
the past decade.2 Generally, microcredit institutions utilize small,
short-term loans to provide credit access to impoverished
entrepreneurs and others ignored by commercial lenders.' With
acknowledgments in mainstream media publications, including
Money Magazine, CBS Evening News,' and even a recent episode
of The Simpsons,6 P2P lending is no longer an obscure financial
experiment, but a widely recognized financial concept.
P2P lending is the designation given to financial
transactions that bypass conventional intermediaries by directly
connecting borrowers and lenders.! The P2P lending industry
emerged in 2005, attempting to provide borrowers with an
8
alternative to traditional lending institutions, especially as typical
1. Also referred to as Person-to-Person lending.
2. Rajdeep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon, The Microfinance Revolution: An
Overview, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV., Jan-Feb 2008, at 9, 9, available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/01/JanFeb08Review.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Alexis Jeffries & Donna Rosato, 5 Ways to Pump Up Your Income, MONEY
MAG., Dec. 2009, at 82.
5. CBS Evening News: New Way to Borrow Money (CBS television broadcast
Feb. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=2457856n&tag=related;photovideo
(reporting the experiences of individual borrowers and lenders using Prosper
Marketplace, Inc.).
6. The Simpsons: Loan-a-Lisa (Fox television broadcast Oct. 3, 2010)
(portraying the basic concepts of P2P lending).
7. See Alan B. Krueger, In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for Cash,
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:17 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-credit-crisis-some-turn-to-online-
peers-for-cash/ ("P2P lending is a way to link lenders to borrowers without
intermediation by a bank . . ).
8. Ian J. Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community Development Finance
2 (Cmty. Dev. Inv. Ctr., Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2009-06,
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credit markets became inaccessible during the recent credit crisis.9
During the credit freeze, traditional lenders often denied potential
borrowers who posed reasonable credit risks and these borrowers
were able to turn to P2P lenders for loans.'0
P2P lending companies provide online platforms for
individual borrowers and lenders to make small, unsecured loans."
Prior to widespread internet access, connecting individual
borrowers and lenders in an efficient loan marketplace was simply
not practical.12 While the emerging P2P lending industry is only a
small fraction of the world financial system, its potential
significance has not gone unnoticed." Chris Larsen, the CEO of
Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (Prosper), 4 one of the two largest P2P
lending companies in the United States," recently suggested that
the industry could grow over $5 billion in the span of a year.
Although estimations of such extensive growth turned out to be
overly optimistic, Prosper and Lending Club, the second of the two
largest U.S. P2P lending companies, each had originated nearly
2009), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2009/wp2009-06.pdf.
9. Krueger, supra note 7.
10. Id. (discussing statements by Devin Pope, an economist at The Wharton
School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, who pointed out that the
fraction of borrowers with higher credit scores increased at Prosper during the
preceding year).
11. Mingfeng Lin et al., Social Networks as Signaling Mechanisms: Evidence
from Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 1 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished paper), available at
http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-bakos/wise/papers/wise2009-p09-paper.pdf.
12. See id. at 6-7 (stating that the internet enables efficient online markets,
bringing buyers and sellers together).
13. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Global Financial Literacy Summit in Washington, D.C.: Community
Development Financial Institutions: Challenges and Opportunities (June 17,2009),
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke20090 6 l 7a.htm (noting
that peer-to-peer lending entities "hold promise").
14. Prosper was the first for profit P2P lending company in the United States and
remained the largest P2P lender in terms of originated loans until Lending Club
surpassed them in Januay 2011. Institutional Investment Through Prosper, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/about/institutionall (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
15. See Silla Brush, Online Lender Lobbies Congress for Industry Consumer
Regulator, THE HILL (June 9, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/102323-online-lender-lobbies-congress-for-industry-consumer-regulator.
16. Galloway, supra note 8, at 2 (referencing the Prosper CEO's comments that
research studies indicated the P2P lending industry could grow from $647 million in
2009 to $5.8 billion in 2010).
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$218 million in loans as of January 2011.' And, growth forecasts
remain positive, with a recent study forecasting that the industry
could grow to $5 billion in outstanding loans by 2013, up over
sixty-six percent."
For this new industry to survive and grow in the U.S.
market, the current regulatory scheme must undergo some
significant changes.19 The stringent SEC registration requirements
should be relaxed, with regulatory oversight reduced to levels
necessary to maintain consumer confidence in the sector.20
Additionally, P2P lenders must explore alternative methods for
increasing revenue, including ad sales, third party business
referrals, or expanded social networking options.21
This Note will analyze the future of the P2P lending
industry as it emerges under the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).22  More
specifically, this Note will evaluate the current regulation of the
P2P lending industry, analyzing the SEC's decision to consider the
notes as securities.23 Then, this note will explain the need for
changes in P2P lending regulation, the impact of Dodd-Frank with
respect to those changes, and suggestions for regulatory reform
critical to the future success of the industry.24
Part II will briefly cover the emergence of P2P lending,
noting the microfinance characteristics that still pervade the novel
industry.2 This discussion will include the potential benefits of
17. Statistics: Performance Data Nov. 1, 2005 - Jan. 31, 2011, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx (enter the dates indicated above
under "Loan origination date") (last visited Jan. 31,2011); Lending Club Statistics:
Total Loans Funded, LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
18. Robert Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, An Online Lender Takes on the SEC,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 14, 2010, at 25 (citing Gartner research firm's
prediction in January 2010 that P2P lending will grow to $5 billion in outstanding
loans by 2013).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.); see infra Part III.C-D.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Parts III-IV.
25. See infra Part II.
1412011]
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P2P lending, including high returns for investors, low default rates,
and community development.26 Further, this section will review
the lending models employed by the two largest P2P lending
companies in the United States.27
Part III will deal with the regulation of the industry,
explaining the relaxed regulatory atmosphere enjoyed at the
industry's inception, examining regulation under the SEC, and
assessing potential changes to the regulatory scheme under Dodd-
Frank.x
Finally, Part IV will expand upon the previous section,
inspecting the reality of the situation in the P2P lending sector and
suggesting changes to the company practices and regulatory
scheme that will benefit companies and consumers in the
industry.29
II. THE EMERGENCE OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
Microfinance ideals have been utilized for centuries in
countries such as Ghana, India, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Bolivia.30
More formal microfinance institutions emerged later, with the
Irish Loan Fund created in the early 1700s in an effort to aid
impoverished citizens in Ireland." Over time, the Irish Loan Fund
became a larger organization, charging interest on small, short-
term loans and eventually reaching twenty percent of all Irish
families annually.
Similarly, the modern microfinance movement began as an
initiative to aid people living in poverty." Muhammad Yunus,
founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, was awarded the
Noble Peace Prize in 2006 for his efforts to use microcredit3 as a
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.




33. Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 2, at 9.
34. Id. at 9-10 (distinguishing microcredit from microfinance, which is inclusive of
microcredit).
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catalyst to end the cycle of poverty for many borrowers. 5  It is
estimated that there are between 1000 and 2500 microfinance
institutions in over 100 countries worldwide serving over 67 million
people.3 6  While there have been failures, many of these
institutions have been highly successful.7 And, although the
majority of microfinance institutions are nonprofit organizations
with the primary goal of aiding the impoverished, the benefits
realized by microfinance institutions have attracted for-profit
companies to the sector as well, 9 including Prosper and Lending
Club.4
A. Potential Benefits of P2P Lending
Perhaps the most widely advertised benefit for lenders
interested in P2P lending is the possibility of higher returns than
those achievable with investments available in traditional
markets.41  Additionally, P2P lending offers a new asset class,
allowing investors to further diversify their portfolios.4 2 Although
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 9.
37. See Grameen Bank Annual Report 2009, GRAMEEN.COM,
http://www.grameen.com/ (follow "Annual Report 2009" hyperlink under "Data &
Reports") (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (reporting substantial profitability and a loan
recovery rate of 97.46 percent - recovery rate determined by dividing the "loan loss
provision" by "total outstanding loans," Tk.1.428 mil./ 56.359 mil.); Molly
Richardson, Note, Increasing Microlending Potential in the United States Through a
Strategic Approach to Regulatory Reform, 34 J. CORP. L. 923, 928 (2009) (listing the
profitability of the Grameen Bank as $20 million and Bank Rakyat of Indonesia as
$200 million in 2006).
38. B. Seth McNew, Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions: A
Proposal for a Balanced Approach, 15 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 287, 296 (2009)
(discussing that the majority of microfinance institutions still rely on donations or
governmental support).
39. Jane J. Kim, Peer-to-Peer Lender Relaunched, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2009, at
D5 (detailing some of the benefits of P2P lending, including higher interest rates for
lenders and accessible credit for borrowers).
40. The author would like to give special thanks to Robert E. (Ricky) May, Jr., a
Lending Club lender member, for providing a firsthand look at the lending platform
and the information available to member lenders when making investment decisions.
41. See Peter J. Brennan, Peer-to-Peer Lending Lures Investors With 12% Return
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2009, 4:24 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXHz9ZSVg31E.
42. See Online Investing and Peer-to-Peer Lending: A Great Way to Diversify
While Investing in Real People, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.comlinvest/about investing.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
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some lenders may have achieved high returns, for the average
lender this may not yet be an advantage, with an average annual
return of only 2.8% at Prosper as of April 2009 due to a high level
of defaulting borrowers.4 ' However, the average return for lenders
has increased as credit history information has improved, reaching
4.8% at Prosper between March 2007 and April 2009." As of
January 8, 2010, Prosper estimated an average return of 7.58%45 on
AA-B" rated investments originated between July 2009 and June
2010. This estimate could prove to be overly optimistic, as
historical market performance data indicates returns on this class
of investment have been around 5.43%, but the increase in
estimated returns is still encouraging.47 More impressively,
Lending Club claimed an average annual return of 9.67% between
June 1, 2007 and October 15, 2010." Even Prosper's 5.43%
average annual return for that period seems rather impressive
though, given that the S&P 500 lost 23.83% over the same time
period.49 While the financial markets were experiencing extremely
atypical movements during that time period, the gradual increase
in average lender return offers promise that a high return will
eventually be a realistic attraction for P2P lenders.
43. See Kim, supra note 39 (explaining that defaults were the reason for such low
average returns).
44. Id. (suggesting that additional information on borrowers was the reason for
the improvement in returns between March 2007 and April 2009).
45. Marketplace Investor Performance: July 2009 - June 2010 Loans, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/welcome/marketplace.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
46. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2-5 (Dec. 31,
2009) [hereinafter Prosper Annual Report] (describing the factors that go into
Prosper's borrower risk rating system, AA being the highest and HR being the
lowest).
47. Marketplace Investor Performance: Loans Originated Nov. 2005 - June 2009,
PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/welcome/marketplace.aspx (last visited Jan. 31,
2011) (follow "click here" hyperlink to view additional performance data) (showing
lender yield and credit loss on AA-B rated investments as 9.00% and 3.57%,
respectively, yielding a return of 5.43%).
4& How Lending Club Works: A More Efficient Model, LENDINGCLUB,
http://www.lendingclub.com/public/more-efficient-model.action (last visited Jan. 31,
2011).
49. Return was calculated using the closing prices of the S&P 500 Index on Oct.
31, 2005 (1207.01) and June 30, 2009 (919.32), index prices obtained using
finance.yahoo.com. But see How Lending Club Works, A More Efficient Model,
supra note 48 (noting that the S&P only lost 2.26% over the time period used to
calculate the average annual return at Lending Club).
50. See S&P 500: Total and Inflation-Adjusted Historical Returns: Annual
[Vol. 15144
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Another alleged benefit of P2P lending is the low default
rate. However, the low default rate claims of other microfinance
lenders, including Grameen Bank, have been called into
question." Further, non-profit microcredit initiatives in the United
States have been less successful than similar institutions in
developing countries.52 Be that as it may, the P2P lending industry
is currently attracting an increasing number of borrowers with
more attractive credit risk.53 This only adds to the industry's
promise of growth and could potentially lead to far lower default
rates in the future.54
Another notable benefit of P2P lending is that it provides
small business owners and individual entrepreneurs with access to
lending services when they may otherwise be excluded from
traditional loan sources." Additionally, loans to low-income
borrowers will often be at lower interest rates than are available
through traditional sources, as P2P lending largely cuts out the
financial intermediary. This can create benefits for entire
communities, providing low-income individuals with opportunities
Averages per Decade, SIMPLESTOCKINVESTING.COM,
http://www.simplestockinvesting.com/SP500-historical-real-total-returns.htm
(charting the annual real total return of the S&P 500 as 7.0% between 1950 and
2009).
51. Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist
Morality of Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 85, 98 & n.38
(2002) (citing that loan default rates at the well-known Grameen Bank are much
higher than claimed); Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 2, at 19 (citing Jonathan
Morduch's study on the accounting standards of the Grameen Bank, which calculates
loan delinquency rates based on "the value of loans overdue (for more than one
year) divided by the current portfolio," thus, generating much lower delinquency
rates than if the percentage had been calculated based on "the size of the portfolio
when the overdue loans were issued") (emphasis added).
52. See Richardson, supra note 37, at 929-34 (explaining issues such as higher
default rates, saturated entrepreneurial markets, and formalized credit markets as
factors hindering microlending in the United States).
53. Krueger, supra note 7; Marketplace Investor Performance: Originations by
Year Based on Credit Score, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/welcome/marketplace.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011)
(showing 84% of the loan originations in 2008 were by borrowers with a credit score
greater than 640, versus only 58% in 2006).
54. See supra Part II.A.
55. McNew, supra note 38, at 294.
56. Brad Slavin, Peer-to-Peer Lending - An Industry Insight, BRADSLAVIN.COM
3-4 (June 21, 2007), http://cdn.bradslavin.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/06/peer-to-
peer-lending.pdf.
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to build businesses, establish financial independence, and engage
in neighborhood development projects. In turn, activities like
these tend to result in community-wide improvements in health,
education, and overall well-being. 8
B. Lending Models
Neither Prosper nor Lending Club offers a pure P2P
lending model, which would allow lenders to loan directly to
borrowers absent any intermediation." Instead, each service has a
hand in facilitating the lending transactions, both basing their
business models around fees generated from loan service and
origination.m Prosper charges a 0.5% origination fee for its highest
rated borrowers, an origination fee of 3.0% for moderately risky
borrowers, and an origination fee of 4.5% for the riskiest
borrowers. Also, Prosper charges borrowers a $15 late payment
fee and charges lenders a 1.0% annual loan-servicing fee.
Similarly, Lending Club has its own borrower rating
system, assigning borrowers to a rating based on credit scores,6
57. Galloway, supra note 8, at 9.
58. See McNew, supra note 38, at 294.
59. Galloway, supra note 8, at 1.
60. Carl E. Smith, If It's Not Broken, Don't Fix It: The SEC's Regulation of Peer-
to-Peer Lending, 6 Bus. L. BRIEF 21, 21 (2009), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edulblb/documents/AUBLBFall09Smith.pdf?rd=1.
61. How to Invest: Prosper Ratings, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/invest/how-to-invest/prosper-ratings/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2011) (identifying AA as the highest Prosper Rating and estimating an annual loan
loss rate of 0.0%-1.99% for these borrowers). The Prosper Rating is a proprietary
rating system based on a borrower's credit score as well as the Prosper Score, which
is based on the number of trades, delinquent accounts, credit inquiries, recently
opened trades, available credit line, and bankcard utilization. Id.
62. Id. (identifying C-HR as high risk borrowers and estimating an annual loan
loss rate between 6.0% and greater than 15.0%). As of January 31, 2011, Prosper
was no longer offering loans to borrowers with an HR Prosper Rating. Fees and
Charges: Fees Borrowers Pay, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/help/topics/other-
fees.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
63. Fees and Charges: Fees Borrowers Pay, supra note 62 (explaining that the fee
is either $15 or 5% of the outstanding payment due, and that the collection of this
particular fee is passed on to lenders; also adding that lenders will be charged
collection agency fees if anything is recovered from a delinquent borrower after
thirty days). The current charge is 17% of the recovery amount. Collection Agencies,
PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/help/topics/lender-collection-agencies.aspx (last
visited Jan. 31, 2011).
64. Rates and Fees: Borrower Origination Fee, LENDINGCLUB,
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with the highest rated borrowers paying a 2.0% origination fee,
moderately risky borrowers paying a 4.0-5.0% origination fee, and
higher risk borrowers paying a 5.0% origination fee. Just as
Prosper does, Lending Club charges borrowers a $15 late payment
fee and charges lenders a 1.0% annual loan servicing fee."6 The fee
structures at Prosper and Lending Club are very similar, and
although the lending models of the companies originally varied,
Prosper has recently changed its lending model to resemble the
model utilized at Lending Club.
Lending models are considered direct when individual
users can contribute directly to a loan.68 For example, if a lender is
able to contribute to a specific loan without the lending service's
participation, then the funding of the loan is direct.69 With regards
to pricing, that aspect of the loan is considered direct when the
borrower establishes the maximum interest rate at which he would
accept the loan.70 Alternatively, when the lending company
establishes the interest rate for a loan the pricing of the transaction
is considered intermediated.7
Lending Club's platform simulates a direct funding model,
but an intermediate model with respect to pricing.72 This means
that when a borrower applies for a loan, Lending Club assesses the
https://www.lendingelub.comlpublic/rates-and-fees.action (last visited Jan. 31, 2011)
(explaining that Lending Club also considers factors in addition to the credit score in
the ultimate borrower rating).
65. Id. (charting the different borrower ratings, which are divided into A-G
categories, and then subdivided within each of those categories (1-5) to determine the
interest rate the borrower pays).
66. Id. (adding that there are additional collection fees on amounts recovered
from delinquent borrowers, as well as explaining that late payment fees are passed on
to lenders and can amount to as much as 5% of the outstanding payment due).
67. As of December 2010, Prosper had changed its lending model significantly
from prior months. Prosper now sets interest rates just as Lending Club does, rather
than allowing lenders on the platform to bid down the maximum interest rate set by
the borrower. This is a significant change from the auction style platform that
Prosper originally developed and had in place during the majority of 2010. Mark
Calvey, Prosper Shelves Auctions Amid Criticism, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2010,
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/print-edition/2010/12/24/prosper-shelves-
auctions-amid-criticism.html.




72. Id. at 3.
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borrower's creditworthiness and determines an appropriate rate
based on the borrower's risk of default." Following this, Lending
Club posts the loan as a note on its network, where investors can
then choose to fund a portion of the principal based on the
established interest rate and credit grade.74 The model seems to be
working for members, with Lending Club boasting of an average
lender return of 9.67% over the last three years, as previously
mentioned."
Although the Lending Club platform simulates direct
funding of the borrower loans by the lenders, the funding portion
of the transaction is actually intermediated. To avoid the need
for individual state lending licenses and to provide loans to
borrowers uniformly throughout the United States, each borrower
loan is made from WebBank, an industrial bank based in Utah, as
a typical consumer loan. WebBank furnishes the loan proceeds
in exchange for a corresponding promissory note from the
borrower.78  Lending Club then provides WebBank with the
aggregate funding received from lenders for the specified loan in
exchange for the assignment of the borrower's promissory note. 79
Following the assignment from Webank, Lending Club collects the
monthly payments from its borrowers and distributes the proceeds
to the lenders based on each lender's pro rata investment in the
loan after deducting Lending Club's one percent service charge.o
Originally, Prosper employed a slightly different model,
although it has always used WebBank to facilitate the loan
73. See id. at 5.
74. See Investing: Diversification, LENDINGCLUB,
http://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action (last visited Jan.
31, 2011).
75. How Lending Club Works, A More Efficient Model, supra note 48
(comparing Lending Club returns to the S&P 500 (-4.46%), Morningstar U.S.
Corporate Bond Index (7.11%), NASDAQ (0.16%), and others over the same
period).
76. See generally LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (June
20, 2008) [hereinafter LendingClub Registration Statement] (noting that the
industrial bank which serves as an intermediary between borrowers and lenders is a
legal formality used for uniformity and to avoid state lending license requirements).
77. Id. at 25.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 6.
[Vol. 15148
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transactions in the same manner as Lending Club." Instead of
setting loan interest rates based on credit ratings, Prosper used an
82
auction process to set interest rates for member loans. Now,
Prosper has adjusted its lending model to look very similar to the
model used by Lending Club, with Prosper setting the interest
83
rates instead of letting an auction process determine them.
Borrowers must have a credit score of at least 640 and then they
are assigned a Prosper Rating that is the basis for the interest rate
Prosper sets for the loan." Over a fourteen-day period, lenders
"bid" on the loan incrementally until the borrowers total loan
request is filled. Prosper also takes advantage of more traditional
microfinance techniques, creating social pressure to encourage
repayment, thus lowering default rates in a manner similar to the
community lending practices utilized by the Grameen Bank.
Borrowers and lenders are able to provide detailed profiles,
increasing the social aspects of the online loan transaction.87
Further, Prosper encourages borrowers and lenders to join
together in groups with tight affiliations in an additional effort to
foster a sense of community, bolstering the social elements of the
loans.'
81. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 4.
82. See How Prosper Works, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/welcome/how it-works.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
83. Borrower Tutorial: Create Your Listing, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/help/tutorials/listing-1.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
84. Prosper Borrower Help: Who Can Borrow Money on Prosper?, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/help/borrowing.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011); Invest:
Prosper Ratings, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.comlinvest/how-to-invest/prosper-
ratings/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
85. Borrower Tutorial: Lenders Choose to Invest in Your Loan, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/help/tutorials/listing-2.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
Prosper still uses the word "bid" in describing lender investment in a loan, but the
recent changes to its model have ultimately removed the bidding process from the
platform. See Borrower Tutorial: Create Your Listing, supra note 83 (explaining that
Prosper determines the interest rate on each loan based on the Prosper Rating).
86. Galloway, supra note 8 (stating that Prosper hopes borrowers will feel more
obligated to repay their loans by organizing online social groups, linked by interests
or alma mater); Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 2, at 11-12 (explaining that most
economists credit the success of the Grameen bank to its group lending contracts
which put social pressure on borrowers to repay loans).
87. See How to Create a Successful Borrower Listing, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/help/topics/borrower-create successfullisting.aspx (last
visited Jan. 31, 2011); Sengupta & Aubuchon, supra note 2, at 11-12.
88. See Prosper Groups, PROSPER,
1492011]
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III. REGULATION OF THE P2P LENDING INDUSTRY
The P2P lending industry is a young and emerging industry,
but already it has seen significant regulatory changes in the United
States.g9 Prosper and Lending Club began operations in 2005 and
2007, respectively, largely unregulated." However, all of that
changed November 23, 2008 when the SEC issued a cease-and-
desist order against Prosper.91 While SEC regulation adds a
significant burden to P2P lending companies, additional oversight
was certainly needed.92 The relaxed regulatory approach allowed
lender members to enter into risky loans without adequate
information, resulting in enormous default rates, with more than
twenty-four percent of Prosper borrowers defaulting in the period
between the commencement of operations and the shut-down of
operations on October 16, 2008, just prior to the issuance of the
SEC cease and desist order.93 The high number of defaults at
Prosper was in direct contradiction to the low default rates that are
often cited as a significant benefit of microfinance.94 Further, the
high default rates alarmed the SEC as to the safety of these
http://www.prosper.com/groups/?search-string= (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (showing
member groups based on similar purposes for Prosper involvement, school
affiliations, employers, etc.).
89. See infra Part III.
90. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 34 (explaining that the notes
were not registered under the Securities Act from February 2006 through October 16,
2008); LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 44 (March 31, 2009)
[hereinafter LendingClub Annual Report] (stating that the original platform did not
list securities in compliance with the Securities Act).
91. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Prosper Cease-
and-Desist Order].
92. See id. (concluding that additional safeguards are needed because there is no
other regulator to protect lenders from the risks presented by the Prosper platform).
But see Smith, supra note 60, at 21 ("[T]he SEC should have allowed the status quo
to continue to permit the maturation of both the peer-to-peer lending market and its
products.").
93. See Statistics: Performance Data Feb. 1, 2006 - Oct. 15, 2008, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.comlinvest/performance.aspx (enter the dates indicated above
under "Loan origination date") (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (charting data on loan
originations between February 2006 and October 15, 2008, and showing an aggregate
default rate of 23.83%).
94. See supra Part II.A.
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investments for consumers, and it also hurt the growth potential of
Prosper as many people became skeptical of the concept.5
A. Regulating Microfinance In General
There is no question that microfinance institutions as a
whole need some regulatory oversight.6 Too much, though, and
the cost of compliance becomes so high as to preclude real
development in the sector.9 At a minimum, all microfinance
entities, and certainly for-profit P2P lenders, must have regulations
to protect "borrowers against abusive lending and collection
practices, and [to] provid[e] borrowers [and lenders] with truth in
lending." 98  The challenge for regulators is finding a balance
between sufficient regulation for borrower and lender protection
without overburdening the industry.
It is unlikely that uniform global regulation of microfinance
institutions is practical, or even possible, given the varying roles of
microfinance in different parts of the world.99 Looking specifically
at P2P lending entities in the United States,'? however, it is
evident that there have already been clear successes and failures in
terms of implemented regulation. The minimal regulation
95. See Mark Gimein, You Are Unlikely to Prosper, THEBIGMONEY.COM (Jan.
18, 2010, 10:23 PM), http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/money-
trail/2010/01/18/you-are-unlikely-prosper (identifying the obvious risks of P2P
lending and even mentioning a forum called Prospers.org which allows frustrated
lenders to share their stories); Felix Salmon, The Problem With Peer-to-Peer Lending,
BLOG.REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 12:05 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2010/01/19/the-problem-with-peer-to-peer-lending/. But see An Open Letter
to The Big Money: Retract Your Story, PROSPER BLOG (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://blog.prosper.com/2010/01/19/an-open-letter-to-the-big-money-retract-your-
story/ (contending that many of Mr. Gimein's comments were erroneous and
overstated).
96. The catastrophic implications of having absolutely no regulations are not
hard to imagine: fraud, money laundering, thwarted consumers to name a few.
97. McNew, supra note 38, at 288 (adding that too much regulation takes away
the flexibility microfinance institutions require to be successful).
98. ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN ET AL., MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES:
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE 7
(CGAP/ The World Bank Grp., 2003), available at
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2787/GuidelineRegSup.pdf.
99. See id. at 6.
100. The focus throughout this note is on the two largest U.S. P2P lending
companies, Prosper and LendingClub.
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employed at the onset of this fledgling industry demonstrated the
problems of such a regulatory absence, with "adverse selection"
resulting in high default rates and deterrence of potential
lenders.' The occurrence of "adverse selection" is a result of the
high-risk borrowers that P2P lenders tend to attract, primarily
because the target consumers are those borrowers turned away by
traditional lenders.0 Further, many Prosper lenders were not
satisfied with the original effort to collect from borrowers on
defaulted loans.103 And, because the loans were unsecured,'" there
was no additional recourse for lenders if Prosper was unsuccessful
in its collection efforts.
B. Regulation Under the SEC
Perhaps the industry would have corrected some of its
problems even if the SEC had not stepped in. Notably, as the
credit crisis worsened and traditional lenders denied an even
greater range of potential borrowers, better credit risks entered
the P2P lending sector,'os significantly decreasing the number of
defaults at Prosper.'6 However, the cease-and-desist order issued
by the SEC shut down Prosper's operations in the midst of the
credit crisis, impairing growth in the industry during the period.107
101. Krueger, supra note 7 ("The sites tend to attract high-risk borrowers who are
unable to obtain credit at lower rates from traditional sources like a bank.").
102. Id.
103. Sam Rose, The Prosper Lender Rebellion and the U.S. Credit/Borrowing
Black Hole, P2P FOUNDATION (August 16, 2007, 6:07 PM),
http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/the-prosper-lender-rebellion-and-the-us-
creditborrowing-black-hole/2007/08/16.
104. CHRISTEN ET AL., supra note 98, at 10 (noting the benefits to "borrowers,
lenders, and the national economy" when loans are backed with collateral).
105. Krueger, supra note 7 (suggesting that the credit crisis is also a likely factor in
the increase of P2P borrowers).
106. Compare Statistics: Performance Data Nov. 1, 2005 - Nov. 1, 2007, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx (enter the dates indicated above
under "Loan origination date") (last visited Jan. 31, 2011), with Statistics:
Performance Data Nov. 1, 2007 - Jan. 31, 2011, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx (enter the dates indicated above
under "Loan origination date") (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (showing the decrease in
charge-offs during the last four years of Prosper's operations from the first two
years).
107. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91.
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The SEC's cease-and-desist order referenced the Supreme
Court's precedents in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.1" and Reves v. Ernst
& Young," concluding that Prosper's notes were securities."o
Once the notes were determined to be securities, they were
correspondingly considered unregistered securities, as Prosper had
not registered any of its loans with the SEC."' Consequently, the
SEC concluded that Prosper had violated Sections 5(a)"2 and (c)" 3
of the Securities Act and ordered the company "[p]ursuant to
Section 8AH4 of the Securities Act, ... [to] cease and desist from
committing or causing any violations and any future violations of
Sections 5(a) or (c) of the Securities Act.""' To comply, Prosper
116
shut down its lending platform until July 13, 2009. Lending Club,
preferring not to fight with the SEC, had already closed its lending
platform, shutting down from April 7, 2008 until October 13, 2008,
so that it could file a registration statement and come into
compliance with SEC rules."
108. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (defining an investment
contract as "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure
income or profit from its employment" (citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.,
146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920))).
109. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1990) (explaining that an
instrument is probably a security when the "seller's purpose is to raise money for the
general use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the
buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate").
110. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 5-6 (concluding that
Prosper notes are securities because lenders are motivated by an expected return, the
loans are offered to the general public, reasonable investors expect that the loans are
investments, and there is no other regulator reducing the risks to investors).
111. Id.
112. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a) & (c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (providing that it is
illegal for a person "to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails" in order to sell an
unregistered security).
113. Id. (stating that it is illegal for a person directly, or indirectly, to offer to sell
or offer to buy an unregistered security using any means of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or the mail).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2006) (authorizing the SEC to require any person found in
violation of any portion of the subchapter to cease and desist from any action "that is
violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of the subchapter").
115. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 6.
116. Smith, supra note 60, at 23.
117. Id.
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1. The SEC's Application of Howey is Unnecessary
Under the precedent established by the Supreme Court
decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co."" the SEC determined that
Prosper notes are investment contracts, characterized as securities
under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act."9 An investment
contract is defined as "[i] an investment of money in [ii] a common
enterprise with [iii] profits to come solely from the efforts of
others." 20 In the SEC's evaluation of the notes offered by Prosper,
they found that all three elements of an investment contract were
present. The SEC concluded that (i) there is an investment of
money when the lenders purchase a loan; (ii) a common enterprise
exists because borrowers and lenders are dependent on Prosper to
make loans available for investment, to ensure timely loan
repayments, and to diversify loan funding among multiple lenders;
and (iii) the profits for lenders come solely from Prosper's
122collection of borrower repayments.
The SEC is clearly justified to find that Prosper notes
satisfy the first element of an investment contract, as established in
123Howey. Lenders provide capital to fund the notes and bear all of
the risk of loss in the case of borrower default.124  Likewise,
Prosper notes clearly meet the third element of an investment
contract established in Howey, with lenders providing capital for
borrower loans due to profit incentives.'2 Lenders are prohibited
from making direct contact with borrowers, and thus, completely
rely on the efforts of Prosper in order to collect borrower
repayments and to recognize any profits.' However, to find that
the investment of money was "in a common enterprise," the
118. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
119. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 3.
120. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 301.
121. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 4.
122. Id.
123. See id. (outlining the requirement of an investment of money, which is clearly
present with Prosper notes).
124. Id.
125. See How Lending Club Works, A More Efficient Model, supra note 48; How
Prosper Works, supra note 82 (explaining how each platform can provide investors
with better returns by avoiding traditional intermediation).
126. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 4.
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second element of an investment contract in Howey, is less
consistent with established precedent. 127
The SEC reasoned that a common enterprise exists at
Prosper because borrowers and lenders depend on Prosper to
service and originate loans, Prosper charges fees for those services,
and most loans are funded by multiple lenders.1 28 Conversely, the
aspects of a common enterprise referenced in Howey are notably
different. 29 In Howey, promoters offered an investment
opportunity in which investors contributed money in return for a
portion of the profits generated by a large citrus fruit operation.3 o
Lenders at Prosper are not actually investing in the Prosper
business; rather, they are investing in individual borrowers with
the assistance of Prosper.'3 1 The venture capital firms that make
equity investments in Prosper are providing capital that more
closely fits the definition of an "investment . . . in a common
enterprise" as established in Howey.132 The individual lender
investments in notes through Prosper's platform entitle lenders to
the stated returns on the loans that they have funded, not to profits
earned by Prosper for its loan servicing and origination services.
Although it is certainly arguable that the Howey analysis
applies because multiple lenders typically fund each loan, it seems
that the SEC's characterization of Prosper notes as investment
contracts is forced and unnecessary. Prosper notes are more like
bonds than investment contracts, as Prosper's platform creates a
marketplace for individual borrowers to receive financing from
lenders in return for repayment of the principal loan plus interest
payments, in essence securitizing the debt of the individual
borrowers.'M  Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the
application of the Howey test to notes, stating that doing otherwise
127. See infra Part III.B.1.
128. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 4.
129. See infra Part II.B.1.
130. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
131. See How Prosper Works, supra note 82.
132. See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293.
133. See How Prosper Works, supra note 82.
134. Id.; Peter Renton, Corporate Bonds vs Lending Club Notes,
SOCIALLENDING.NET (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.sociallending.net/investing-
lending/corporate-bonds-vs-lending-club-notes/.
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would conflict with the intent of Congress when it enacted the
1933 Securities Act and 1934 Act.13 ' Nevertheless, the SEC's
ultimate determination that Prosper notes are securities is clearly
appropriate based on the precedent established in Reves v. Ernst &
Young.136
2. Prosper Notes Are Securities Under Reves
The SEC also found that Prosper notes fall into the
category of securities under the precedent established by the
137
Supreme Court's opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young. Reves
provides that a note is "presumed to be a security unless it bears a
strong resemblance . . . to one of a judicially crafted list of
categories of instrument that are not securities."3 Because the
notes offered by Prosper do not fall on the non-security list,139 the
four part "family resemblance" test must be satisfied in order to
rebut the presumption that a Prosper note is a security. The four
part test identifies the following factors in determining whether a
note is a security: (i) buyer and seller motivations; (ii) the plan of
distribution; (iii) the investing public's reasonable expectations;
and (iv) the possibility of an alternative regulatory scheme.14 1
Considering the first element of the family resemblance
test, Prosper notes resemble securities based on buyer and seller
motivations. Prosper lenders are generally motivated to fund
borrower notes because of the high rate of return achievable
through the investment. 142 Reves indicates that when the buyer of
a note is primarily interested in the profit expected from investing
135. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1990).
136. See id.
137. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 4.
138. Reves, 494 U.S. at 56.
139. Id. at 66 (listing a note delivered in consumer financing, a note secured by a
home mortgage, a short-term note secured by a lien on a small business, a character
loan to a bank customer, and a short-term note secured by accounts receivable as
examples of notes that are not classified as securities); Prosper Cease-and-Desist
Order, supra note 91, at 4.
140. Reves, 494 U.S. at 56.




in the note, it is probably a security.'43 Prosper's website portrays
the notes offered over its platform as alternative investments that
provide an opportunity for portfolio diversification and high
returns.'" So, in the case of Prosper notes the motivation of the
lenders is clearly investment for profit as with a typical security,
and even if some investors are partially motivated by some form of
altruism, the primary motivation is still profit.4 5
Secondly, Prosper notes resemble securities with regard to
the plan of distribution. While the Prosper notes are not traded on
an exchange, they are offered to the general public over the
internet. 46 Prosper lenders are not necessarily sophisticated
investors and rely on information provided by Prosper in order to
make investment decisions.147 All that is required for notes to be
considered securities under the second element of the test is
"common trading" in the instrument.'" By offering the notes for
sale over the internet to a broad segment of the public, the
"common trading" criteria is met. 49
Third, Prosper lenders reasonably expect that the purchase
of notes on the platform is an investment. Reves states that the
"fundamental essence of a 'security' [is] its character as an
'investment."'" 0 The notes in the Reves case were advertised as
investments, and the court held that "there were no countervailing
factors that would have led a reasonable person to question this
characterization."'"' Likewise, Prosper advertises its notes as
investments on its website, comparing the returns on the notes to
returns with more traditional investments. 52 Because Prosper
lenders reasonably expect the notes to be investments and
143. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
144. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 3.
145. Id. at 5.
146. See Online Investing and Peer-to-Peer Lending, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.comlinvest/about-investing.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
147, Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 5.
148. Reves, 494 U.S. at 70.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 68-69.
151. Id. at 69.
152. See How Does Lending on Prosper Measure Up Against the Stock Market?,
PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/about-investing/stock-market/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2011).
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anticipate a return on their investment, the third factor of the
family resemblance test also indicates that Prosper notes are
securities."'
Finally, at the time of the SEC cease-and-desist order,
there was no alternative regulator that was capable of overseeing
Prosper's operations in order to protect potential investors. 5 4
Prior to the cease-and desist-order, lenders were completely
reliant on the statements from Prosper and individual borrowers in
* * 155
making investment decisions, with no regulatory supervision.
Therefore, it was necessary for the SEC to categorize the Prosper
notes as securities in order to provide the essential regulation
needed to reduce the risk to investors.
After evaluating Prosper notes with respect to the four
factors of the family resemblance test it is clear that the notes were
properly designated as securities under the precedent in Reves.
Dodd-Frank has changed the analysis of Prosper notes with
respect to the fourth element of the test, as the new Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) could provide an
alternative regulatory scheme for the notes without characterizing
them as securities."' However, even with the possibility of an
alternative regulator the notes do not pass the family resemblance
test, still resembling securities under the other three elements of
the test. Therefore, the regulation under the SEC will remain in
effect for P2P notes unless Congress specifically designates the
BCFP as the primary regulator of financial instruments like the
notes offered on Prosper's platform.
3. Lending Club Decides Not to Fight, P2P Companies Incur
Increased Costs
Instead of taking on the SEC as Prosper did, once notified
that their notes should be registered, Lending Club decided to
153. Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 5.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 6.
157. See infra Part III.C.
158. See Prosper Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 91, at 6.
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cooperate and filed a registration statement with the SEC on June
20, 2008."9 The decision benefited Lending Club, as they were
able to come into compliance more quickly than Prosper,
reopening operations in October of 2008 and capturing market
share in the sector.16'
Compliance with SEC regulations is costly with Prosper
spending more than $1 million annually in addition to the $5
million spent completing the registration process,' in order to
comply with SEC rules.162 Although Lending Club maintains that
it is happy with SEC regulation, the company is burdened by the
same expensive filing requirements mandated by the SEC. 16 The
burdensome filing requirements levied on the P2P lenders require
each loan to be filed with the SEC as a separate security.'6 In fact,
Prosper and Lending Club make more disclosures to the SEC than
almost any other company, a substantial statistic considering their
relative size.165  Each day, Prosper and Lending Club file
supplements to the prospectuses already on file with the SEC,
166detailing each of the new loans issued that day. These
supplements include the principal amount, anticipated yield, risk
of loss, monthly payment, and an entire borrower credit profile for
each new loan. Because Prosper and Lending Club must include
each loan originated on their lending platforms in the prospectus
in accordance with section 12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
159. LendingClub Registration Statement, supra note 76 (the official filing date
was later changed to Oct. 10, 2008).
160. Brush, supra note 15.
161. Id.
162. Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18.
163. Brush, supra note 15.
164. Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18 (noting that Prosper makes more
disclosures to the SEC than almost any other company).
165. Id.




167. Id. Each borrower credit profile includes the Prosper Score, credit scores,
delinquent accounts, credit inquiries, credit lines, revolving credit balance,
homeownership, debt/income ratio, occupation, employment status, and state of
residence. Id.
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Act,'" the company also has to file quarterly and annual reports in
accordance with section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act. 6 9
The costs of compliance with these regulations are
significant for a company already reporting a net loss in excess of
$5 million for the six months ending on June 30, 2010.o Further,
these costs create substantial barriers to entry in the industry."'
Zopa, a P2P lending service with operations in the UK, Italy, and
Japan, decided not to launch services in the United States, citing
the SEC's registration requirements for P2P companies as a major
factor in the decision.'72 Although Prosper was hopeful that Dodd-
Frank would bring regulatory change to the P2P industry, it does
not appear that Dodd-Frank will provide any significant changes
to the current regulation, as discussed further below.
C. Dodd-Frank Title X - The Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection
When Dodd-Frank was finalized on July 21, 2010, Title X173
contained the provision that established the BCFP, 17 4 a novel entity
P2P lenders hoped would become the new regulator for the P2P
industry.'75 This new agency's "main goal will be to protect
consumers." 7 6 Exploring the pertinent language of this section
provokes some interesting questions about the future of regulation
168. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006) (establishing the
illegality of a "member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security on
a national exchange" unless there is effective registration with the SEC).
169. Id. § 13 (outlining filing periodic filing and book keeping requirements for
issuers of securities registered with the SEC).
170. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-0), at 2 (June 30,
2010) [hereinafter Prosper Quarterly Report].
171. Smith, supra note 60, at 23.
172. Id. at 24 (discussing the Zopa CEO's comment on the SEC regulation as
being a "key reason why [Zopa] didn't... launch in the United States").
173. The discussion of Dodd-Frank in this note begins with Title X because
Prosper's intense lobbying efforts were targeted toward the assignment of the new
BCFP as the primary regulator of the P2P lending industry.
174. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491)
(establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection).
175. See Brush, supra note 15.
176. Melanie H. Brody & Stephanie C. Robinson, Consumer Financial Services




in the P2P lending industry. Section 1002 defines a "consumer
financial product or service" as:
any financial product or service that is described in
one or more categories under - (A) paragraph (15)
and is offered or provided for use by consumers
primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes; or (B) clause (i), (iii), (ix) or (x) of
paragraph (15)(A), and is delivered, offered, or
provided in connection with a consumer financial
product or service referred to in subparagraph
(A). 177
Paragraph 15 goes on to define a "financial product or service,"
and most notably includes:
(i) extending credit and servicing loans, including
acquiring, purchasing, selling, brokering, or other
extensions of credit; . . . (iv) engaging in deposit-
taking activities, transmitting or exchanging funds,
or otherwise acting as a custodian of funds or any
financial instrument for use by or on behalf of a
consumer; . . . [and] (x) collecting debt related to
178any consumer financial product or service.
The services provided by Prosper and Lending Club fall
within the established definition of "financial product or service,"
outlined above. 79 P2P lending companies plainly broker
extensions of credit, transmit and exchange funds, and otherwise
act as custodians of funds and financial instruments.'8o
At first glance, it seems that the BCFP would "regulate the
offering and provision of consumer financial products or
177. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 35 (noting that Prosper is a licensed
lender or loan broker in a number of states).
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services,"'' including P2P lenders as established by the definition
of "financial product or service."182 The authority for the BCFP to
regulate the industry would be established by Section 1022.183
Exactly what this would entail is not completely clear, but it is
probable that any Bureau rules would regulate these consumer
financial products and services so that the "markets for [these
products] operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access
and innovation."
Efficiently operating P2P markets, allowing for access and
innovation, are some of the regulation characteristics Prosper
CEO Chris Larsen pleaded for throughout the legislation process,
arguing that the current SEC regulations drive costs up and detract
from innovation in the sector."' California Congresswoman Jackie
Speier, champion of the provision in the House bill which
originally designated the BCFP as the primary regulator for P2P
companies, declared that the original House proposal "ensure[d]
that both consumers and small lenders [were] fully and
appropriately regulated, and that individuals' financial privacy
[was] protected."186
Despite the efforts of Prosper and Representative Speier,
the final bill contains a critical exclusion in Title X with regards to
entities currently regulated by the SEC.1'8 Section 1027 (i) (1)
expressly states:
no provision of this title may be construed as
altering, amending, or affecting the authority of the
[SEC] to adopt rules, initiate enforcement
proceedings, or take any other action with respect to
a person regulated by the Commission. The Bureau
shall have no authority to exercise any power to
181. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
182. Id. § 1002 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
183. Id. § 1022 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
184. Id. § 1021 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).
185. See Brush, supra note 15 (quoting Chris Larsen, Prosper CEO) ("Every
month that goes by, P2P lending is getting pulled away from what it could be: the
purest form of community banking...
186. Id.
187. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517).
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enforce this title with respect to a person regulated
by the [SEC]."8
Although, the bill does state that:
the [SEC] shall consult and coordinate, where
feasible, with the [BCFP] with respect to any rule
(including any advance notice of proposed
rulemaking) regarding an investment product or
service that is the same type of product as, or that
competes directly with, a consumer financial
product or service that is subject to the jurisdiction
of the [BCFP] under this title or under any other
law. 189
So, under section 1027, the SEC clearly remains the
primary regulator of P2P companies, as the BCFP is not granted
regulatory authority with respect to entities already governed by
the SEC.190 While only a small consolation for Prosper, it does
appear that section 1027 includes a provision that may provide the
BCFP some, even if minimal, input with regard to future rules
within the P2P lending sector.' On the contrary, input from the
BCFP may only create additional regulatory oversight in the
sector, beyond the registration requirements already in place by
the SEC.'92 To the dismay of P2P lenders, P2P companies receive
little reprieve from the current SEC regulation through Title X of
Dodd-Frank.93
188. Id. § 1027(i)(1).
189. Id. § 1027(i)(2).
190. See id. § 1027(i)(1).
191. Id. § 1027(i)(2).
192. See id.
193. See supra Part III.C. But see Brush, supra note 15 (quoting Jason Alteieri,
General Counsel of Lending Club) ("Currently we're fine with the regulation by the
SEC.").
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D. Dodd-Frank Title IX - Comptroller General P2P Industry
Study
Although no relief is granted for P2P lenders in Title X,
there is still a possibility of some regulatory relief. Under Title IX,
entitled "Investor Protections and Improvements to the
Regulation of Securities," new regulations increase securities
investor protections, enlarge the powers of the SEC, and improve
enforcement of current securities laws.1 94 Specifically, Dodd-Frank
has given Prosper some hope of major regulatory reform under
section 989F.'9 ' Section 989F gives the Comptroller General until
July 22, 2011 to study the P2P industry in order to "determine the
optimal Federal regulatory structure."'" The study will involve
"Federal banking agencies, the [SEC], consumer groups, outside
experts, and the person to person lending industry."' 7 Generally,
the study will examine the current regulation of the industry under
the SEC, other regulators currently overseeing P2P lenders, recent
studies of the industry, consumer privacy and anti-money
laundering safeguards needed, and uses of P2P lending. 198
Ultimately, the report by the Comptroller General will suggest
regulatory alternatives for the P2P industry, considering changes
to the current SEC approach with regard to P2P lenders as well as
possible participation of other Federal agencies in the regulatory
scheme.1 9 The report will then be submitted to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the
House Committee on Financial Services.2 0
194. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 901-91 (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.);
MAYER BROWN LLP, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION:
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION Act 101
(2010), available
at http://www.mayerbrown.com/dodd-frank-act/article.asp?id=9360&nid=13007.
195. See Dodd-Frank Act § 989F.
196. Id. (identifying the date by which the Comptroller General must complete the
study of the P2P industry as one year from the effective date of Dodd-Frank, which is
established as July 22, 2010 in section 4).
197. Id. § 989F(a)(1).
198. Id. § 989F(a)(3).
199. Id. § 989F(b) (outlining the content to be reported to the appropriate
congressional committees).
200. Id. (covering the details of the submission of the report).
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Until Congress reviews the study, the impact of Dodd-
Frank on the P2P lending industry is relatively open ended.20' By
July 22, 2011, there will be additional information for Congress to
202consider in determining future changes to the regulatory scheme.
SEC regulation will continue in the interim, costing participants in
the industry substantial compliance fees every day.203  And
although section 989F mandates a study on current P2P lending
regulation, there is a significant possibility that no regulatory
changes will be implemented, as there is no provision in Dodd-
Frank requiring further action from Congress.204 Nonetheless, if
this nascent industry is to survive even ten years into the future,
substantial regulatory changes will be needed to both lower costs
and allow for substantial expansion of loan origination in the
sector.205 Less stringent registration requirements will drastically
reduce compliance costs. 206 Simultaneously, a new regulator will
need to provide enough oversight to build confidence in the sector
so that more borrowers and lenders will use P2P lending
platforms. 207 A growing number of loan originations teamed with
reduced compliance costs would facilitate profitability for P2P
companies, a vital element to achieving sustainability in the
industry.20 8
201. See Dodd-Frank Act § 989F (implementing a study on alternative regulation,
but offering no guarantee of change).
202. See id. (including past and current expert studies of the P2P lending industry
in the report to be submitted to congressional committees).
203. See LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at 26 (covering Lending
Club's continuous effort to comply with government regulation); Prosper Annual
Report, supra note 46, at 34 (covering Prosper's continuous effort to comply with
government regulation).
204. See Dodd-Frank Act § 989F (establishing the requirements and timeline for
the study, but only requiring submission of a report containing regulatory
recommendations to certain congressional committees, and not obligating Congress
to act based on the findings in the report).
205. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 50 (identifying risks inherent to
dealing with Prosper, including risk of failure if unable to increase transaction
volumes and risk of overburdening regulation on the ability to continue service);
LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 46, at 36 (explaining that for the Lending
Club platform to be successful, there must be an increased volume of loan
transactions).
206. See generally Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18 (identifying the substantial
costs incurred due to SEC regulations).
207. See infra Part IV.
208. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 61 (explaining the expectation
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IV. THE FUTURE OF P2P LENDING
There is potential in the P2P lending industry, with support
from notable figures such as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke and increasing public interest in the advantages of
microlending.209 However, P2P lenders like Prosper and Lending
Club face an arduous road if they want to emerge from relative
obscurity, ultimately providing socially beneficial services to
consumers and becoming capable players in the financial sector.2 10
The continuance of SEC regulation in the sector could overburden
the industry, making it difficult to operate profitably.211
In the three months ending on June 30, 2010, Prosper
reported a net loss of $2.6 million and Lending Club reported a net
loss of $2.5 million.212 Although individual lenders remain
interested in funding borrower loans, and Prosper and Lending
Club have been relatively successful in raising fresh capital from
venture capital firms,213 continuing to operate with such high losses
could significantly limit the time frame in which these companies
214
are able to survive.
P2P lenders should continue their efforts to seek regulation
under a less burdensome regulatory scheme, encouraging the
Comptroller General to research the benefits of such a scheme
for growth in the number of borrowers and lenders resulting in increases in
transaction and servicing fees).
209. See Bernanke, supra note 13.
210. See generally Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 48 (denoting the
company's operating losses since inception and the anticipation that they will
continue through 2010); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at 37
(commenting on the lack of profitability since inception, expected increase in
operating expenses, and potential to never attain profitability).
211. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 50 (noting the extensive
federal, state, and local regulation that could potentially affect Prosper's ability to
continue operations).
212. Prosper Quarterly Report, supra note 170, at 2; LendingClub Corp.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-0), at 3 (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter LendingClub
Quarterly Report].
213. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 70-71 (outlining the recent
capital raising activities of Prosper); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at
45 (discussing the continuing public offering of up to $600,000,000, which had raised
approximately $71 million as of March 31, 2010).
214. See Prosper Quarterly Report, supra note 170, at 1 (showing approximately a
$45.9 million accumulated deficit); LendingClub Quarterly Report, supra note 212, at
2 (showing approximately a $32.7 million accumulated deficit).
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during the Dodd-Frank mandated study of P2P lenders.215
Registering every individual borrower loan as a security is a
tedious and costly process that will hinder the long-term growth
and profitability of P2P companies.216 In fact, without dramatic
changes, it is possible that both Prosper and Lending Club will be
217
forced to cease operations in the fairly near future.
Equally important when considering regulatory reform, is
maintaining necessary protections for consumers involved with
these companies.21 8 Prosper had significant difficulties with
defaulting borrowers in its infancy, and while default rates are
improving, they are still too high to substantiate a dramatic
*219increase in loan origination. As previously mentioned, because
P2P loans are unsecured, there is little to encourage borrower
repayment other than damaged credit ratings.220 Further, because
the credit standards for P2P borrowers have increased, the growth
of loan originations has slowed due to fewer qualifying
221borrowers. In turn, these companies are seeing lower than
expected revenues, as transaction and service fees provide the
-222primary source of income.
The viability of these companies is an important concern
for the individual lenders because lenders rely on Prosper and
215. See generally Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18 (commenting on the
general expense of compliance with the SEC).
216. See id. (noting that Prosper makes more disclosures to the SEC than almost
any other company).
217. See Prosper Quarterly Report, supra note 170, at 2; LendingClub Quarterly
Report, supra note 212, at 3 (showing a $45.8 million accumulated deficit at Prosper
and a $32.6 million accumulated deficit at Lending Club, along with continuing
quarterly losses).
218. See Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18 (quoting Donald Langevoort, a
securities professor at Georgetown University) ("[L]oans of hundreds of dollars
[signals a] targeting of very unsophisticated people.").
219. See Statistics: Performance Data Feb. 1, 2006 - Oct. 15, 2008, supra note 93
(charting data on loan originations between February 2006 and October 15, 2008, and
showing an aggregate default rate of 23.83%).
220. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 37-38 (explaining the risk of
borrower default and lack of securitization for the loans); LendingClub Annual
Report, supra note 90, at 30 (explaining the risk of borrower default and lack of
securitization for the loans).
221. See Marketplace Investor Performance, Originations by Year Based on Credit
Score, supra note 53 (showing 84% of loan originations in 2008 to be by borrowers
with a credit score greater than 640, versus only 58% in 2006).
222. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 17.
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Lending Club to collect payments on the outstanding loans.223
Therefore, beyond borrower default rates, lenders face additional
risks from the potential cessation of operations by companies in
the industry, whether it be due to continued operational losses,
liabilities from pending litigation, changes in regulatory treatment,
or increases in competition in the sector or from traditional
lenders.224  Both companies acknowledge that in the event of
bankruptcy proceedings, there is a lot of uncertainty with regard to
the lenders' ability to retrieve funds already distributed to
borrowers as well as those held in lenders' accounts.2 Currently,
funds not disbursed in loans but deposited with Prosper or
Lending Club are held in trust by an outside financial institution
and are insured by the FDIC.226 Although the trust is kept for the
benefit of the lender members, these members could possibly be
required to pursue legal action through the bankruptcy courts in
order to withdraw funds deposited with Prosper or Lending Club
227in the event of insolvency.
In addition to the substantial risks created by factors other
than potential borrower default, Prosper also has a large
contingent liability for securities law violations from securities
issuances dating from the initiation date in February 2006228 until
October 2008.229 Prosper estimates the maximum potential liability
for these violations at a startling $57.7 million.230 This would only
223. See id.
224. Id. at 47-57 (observing general risks of lender member loss due to risks
outside of those inherent to borrower default); LendingClub Annual Report, supra
note 90, at 36-45 (recognizing the general risks of lender member loss due to risks
outside of those inherent to borrower default).
225. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 52 (identifying uncertainties in the
event Prosper filed for bankruptcy); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at
38-39 (referencing that funds held in trust for holders of notes could still potentially
be at risk).
226. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 15 (identifying uncertainties in the
event Prosper filed for bankruptcy); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at
10 (referencing that funds held in trust for holders of notes could still potentially be
at risk).
227. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 52 (identifying uncertainties in the
event Prosper filed for bankruptcy); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at
38-39 (referencing that funds held in trust for holders of notes could still potentially
be at risk).
228. Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 33.
229. Prosper Quarterly Report, supra note 170, at 22.
230. Id. ("[T]he occurrence of the contingency is reasonably possible but not
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be fully assessed if the courts found Prosper entirely liable to the
lenders who accrued losses between February 2006 and October
2008, providing those lenders with the right "to rescission of the
unpaid principal, plus statutory interest." 23 1 It is almost certain
that a liability of that magnitude would be more than Prosper's
strained balance sheet could take, much less the Prosper
shareholders who have already seen rapid growth in the
accumulated deficit.232 While insolvency is far from a certainty for
Prosper, it is a real possibility.233 The insolvency of one of the
major players in the U.S. P2P market would likely shake the entire
sector and undermine lender confidence in the remaining P2P
companies. The priority of regulators should be to protect
consumers involved with the P2P industry, but these regulators
should try to do so in manner that concurrently reduces the
financial stresses imposed on P2P companies by overly stringent
regulation. Upon completion of the Dodd-Frank mandated study,
the Comptroller General should recommend several regulatory
elements that are critical to the safety of borrowers and lenders
engaged in P2P lending, as well as to the future success of P2P
companies.
First, P2P lending companies must increase lender
confidence in the safety and creditworthiness of borrowers.234
Without lender confidence, it is unlikely that the loan originations
and revenue streams will increase for P2P lending companies.
While substantial steps have been taken toward improving lender
confidence, many mandated by SEC regulation,25 there are still
several safeguards that Prosper and Lending Club could
probable .....
231. Id.
232. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at F3 (showing the Prosper
balance sheet and the $40.6 million accumulated deficit).
233. See id. at 48 (stating that Prosper is dependent on raising additional capital in
order to carry out the present business plan).
234. See generally id. at 4-5 (discussing borrower listings, the information provided
by credit rating agencies, and the unverified information provided by individual
borrowers); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at 4-6 (revealing that
borrower reported information such as income, employer, or tenure are not verified).
235. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 2-3 (outlining the minimum
credit requirements for Prosper borrowers); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note
90, at 4-5 (outlining the minimum credit requirements for Lending Club borrowers,
notably more stringent than Prosper minimums).
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implement and that regulators should require to boost lender
confidence.2'
Prosper and Lending Club should verify the information of
every borrower that uses their services. 23 7  Prosper and Lending
Club typically do not "verify the income, employment and
occupation or any other information provided by borrower
members in listings." 238  The lack of verification of borrower
information is analogous to practices employed by many banks
and mortgage lenders leading up to the mortgage crisis with the
issuance of "no doc" loans.29 Lender members do have some
verifiable information, typically provided from a single credit
agency, when deciding whether to contribute to the financing of a
borrower's loan.240 However, lenders are essentially providing
"low doc" loans absent borrower information that even charitable
microfinance entities require when making loans.24' And to make
242
matters worse, these loans are also unsecured.22 The combination
of "low doc" and unsecured loans opens up vast avenues for abuse
of the P2P lending platforms and the lender members.243
An obvious concern with this suggestion is the possibility of
losing potential borrowers as platforms increase documentation
requirements, possibly lowering the number of loans originated
244
and thus reducing revenues for P2P lending companies.
236. See infra Part IV.
237. See generally Gimein, supra note 95 (stating that the results at Prosper
indicate it is a microcosm of failing economy, not a solution).
238. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 4 (discussing borrower listings,
the information provided by credit rating agencies and the unverified information
provided by individual borrowers); LendingClub Annual Report, supra note 90, at 4
(revealing that borrower reported information such as income, employer, or tenure
are not verified).
239. See generally Tami Luhby, Senate Votes to Ban Liar Loans, CNNMONEY.COM
(May 13, 2010, 2:40 PM)
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/13/news/economy/senate-mortgage-rules/index.htm
(reporting on the Senate's decision to ban "liar loans").
240. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 9-12.
241. See McNew, supra note 38, at 304 (stating that a simple assessment of the
borrower's cash flow may be enough for microloan issuance).
242. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 37-38.
243. See generally id. (discussing the risks related to borrower default including the
absence of collateral for any of the loans listed on Prosper).
244. See generally supra Part II.A (indicating that P2P companies predominantly
attract borrowers who have been denied by traditional lenders).
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However, if borrowers were only required to send the P2P lending
companies verifiable tax documents, including information such as
length of employment and annual income, the value to lenders
would probably outweigh the costs. 4 An improvement in default
rates due to an increase in the quality of credit risks would raise
the value of loans to lenders, giving the P2P lending companies the
ability to charge higher servicing fees, offsetting any decrease in
originations.24 Further, the increased validity of information in the
marketplace should attract more lenders, increasing their
willingness to fund loans and their ability to identify profitable
credit risks.247
Secondly, regulators should relax the stringent registration
requirements that require each and every consumer loan issued by
Prosper or Lending Club to be included in a supplement to the
most recent prospectus.2" Loosening these registration
requirements would dramatically reduce compliance costs, helping
249
this young industry to attain profitability in the future.
Moreover, if the P2P lenders are required to verify borrower
employment and income information, along with other relevant
factors, as previously mentioned, the lender members would be
protected from transparency problems and possible borrower
abuses.20 Then, less frequent inspections of P2P companies'
security issuances, by either the SEC or a new regulatory agency
245. See generally Marketplace Investor Performance, PROSPER,
http://www.prosper.com/welcome/marketplace.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011)
(showing the increasing percentage of borrowers with improved credit ratings, which
has correlated with a declining default rate).
246. See generally id. (indicating that the estimated lender yield minus the
estimated loss equals the estimated return, giving rise to the conclusion that
improved information, lowering the uncertainty of the estimated loss, would provide
lenders with the same estimated returns with less variance and less risk, making the
loans better investments).
247. See Risk vs. Return, NEW YORK LIFE (Jun. 8, 2009),
http://www.newyorklife.com/ (search "Risk vs. Return").
248. See Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18 (explaining that Prosper currently
files about two public disclosures per day); Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Prospectus
(Supplement No. 28) (Jan. 7, 2011), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626511000022/listing-20110107-
1742.htm.
249. See Schmidt & Westbrook, supra note 18.
250. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 37; LendingClub Annual
Report, supra note 90, at 31 (listing risks to lender members resulting from
inaccurately reported borrower information).
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such as the BCFP, would be sufficient to protect consumers but at
a much lower cost to the companies.'1
Finally, as long as Prosper and Lending Club are in a state
of relative financial instability, lenders are going to be somewhat
apprehensive about loaning money on the platforms due to the
inherent risks created by the potential insolvency of the
companies. 2 Both Prosper and Lending Club have made
arrangements with third party loan servicing companies in the case
of company insolvency in an effort to assure lenders that their
outstanding loans will continue to be collected in the event of
bankruptcy." However, the companies' annual reports warn that
insolvency escalates the risk of loss to lenders beyond the inherent
risk from the notes. 4 Any future P2P regulatory scheme, whether
enforced by the SEC or BCFP, should allow P2P companies to
engage in activities outside of the primary P2P lending business in
order to increase revenues. There are many prospective activities
that could generate positive cash flows, including selling ad space
on the companies' websites, referring customers to services of
affiliated businesses, and even developing additional services to
provide to customers on the companies' social networks.-" By
increasing the financial stability of P2P companies, lender
confidence would likely increase as the risks attributed to potential
company insolvency declined, attracting more lenders to invest in
216borrower notes. As a result of decreases in risk, P2P companies
251. See generally Brush, supra note 15 (mentioning that the BCFP could better
regulate the consumer data transmitted to P2P companies, perhaps allowing lenders
too see more borrower information when deciding to extend a loan).
252. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 47-48; LendingClub Annual
Report, supra note 90, at 36-37.
253. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 50; LendingClub Annual
Report, supra note 90, at 38 (noting that a third party servicing arrangement has been
established in the case of insolvency, although there is a risk of delay and increased
costs).
254. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 51; LendingClub Annual
Report, supra note 90, at 37.
255. See Efraim Turban et al., Zopa, Prosper, and P2P Lending: Will They Disrupt
Banking?, in ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE, ONLINE
SUPPLEMENT 9-1 (2010),
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/medialobjects/8362/8562891/additional-online/OnlineFi
les_.Ch09.pdf (indicating that P2P lenders will likely adjust their revenue models to
take advantage of website advertising and the sale of associated products).
256. See Prosper Annual Report, supra note 46, at 50; LendingClub Annual
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could expect a higher number of loan originations, leading to
211revenue growth.
V. CONCLUSION
The GAO study mandated by section 989F of Dodd-Frank
leaves the door open for potential changes in the regulation of the
U.S. P2P lending industry, but this provision far from guarantees
reform.258 Without significant regulatory changes, the prospects of
success and growth in this new industry are bleak.259  While
borrower default rates are improving due to new regulations by
the SEC, the unstable financial condition of Prosper and Lending
Club adds other significant risks that any potential lender member
should consider before investing.2 6
If the Comptroller General aims to encourage
sustainability in the P2P lending industry with the GAO study,
recommendations should include future regulations that require
261P2P companies to verify additional borrower information.
Secondly, although close oversight of the industry is essential,
regulators must reduce the expensive registration requirements
currently imposed on P2P lenders so that costs may be reduced to
reasonable levels.262 And finally, P2P lending companies must find
alternative ways to increase their revenue streams.263 Without
significant changes, for-profit P2P lending companies like Prosper
and Lending Club will likely disappear in the United States,
leaving non-profit organizations and charities to cover the
underserved U.S. microlending sector and thereby eliminating a
Report, supra note 90, at 37.
257. See Risk vs. Return, supra note 247 (explaining that typically greater risks
result in greater returns; this leads to the conclusion that a reduction in risk in P2P
notes, with the expected return remaining constant, will make the notes more
attractive to investors).
258. See supra Part III.D.
259. See supra Part IV.
260. See supra Part IV.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See supra Part IV.
263. See supra Part IV.
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legitimate source of capital otherwise available to many borrowers
for whom traditional institutional lenders are often inaccessible.2 64
JACK R. MAGEE
264. See supra Part IV.
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